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EUROPEAN UNION LEGAL INTEGRATION has been the subject of a
rich, interdisciplinary literature. Studies on the powers of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the dynamics of
preliminary rulings, on the constitutionalization of the Treaties,
and the reach of EU law into national legal systems,
abound. Scholars have theorized that the ECJ and EU law
have been a driving force of integration, perhaps the driving
force in times of eurosclerosis as suggested by Cassis de
Dijon and other famous rulings. It is all the more surprising
then that we know little about the professions that partake in
the process, the judges, jurists and lawyers that are implicated.
We now have many studies on the Commission or the
Parliament and on Brussels interest groups. EU policy studies
tend to focus on actors within these institutions, only mentioning
in passing the relevant jurisprudence in their area. Legal
expertise is often seen as key in pushing policy agendas yet it
is taken for granted rather than analysed. Yet, if EU law is so
important in the history of European integration, a promising
research agenda would be to take EU legal studies and EU
lawyers as an object of study. How has the EU changed the
teaching of law in member states’ universities? What is its
reach in the various sub-disciplines of the field? Is a European
doctrine emerging? What is the trajectory of those that
specialize in EU law? What is the ECJ judges’ vision of the
role of the law? These are among the questions that a
sociology of EU law could answer. As EUSA brings together
many disciplines including legal scholars and other social
sciences, this issue should be of interest to most of us. To
help develop a sociology of EU law, this forum brings together
two legal scholars that reflect on the ways that the community
of EU lawyers conceives EU law. The lively debate between
Harm Schepel and Damian Chalmers suggests that there is a
plurality of position in the legal field as to the role of EU law
and its relationship to European society, politics and economics.
 -Virginie Guiraudon, EUSA Forum Editor
Law, Lawyers, and Legal Integration
Harm Schepel
LAW HAS BEEN A POWERFUL INTEGRATING FORCE in Europe. Indeed,
very few students of European integration would deny the
paramount role law has played in the partial transformation
of the Community into a supranational polity of sorts. Legal
scholars know this to be true, but rarely make explicit why it
should be so. Lawyers ‘do’ law, they do not particularly care
to stand back from it. Social scientists have no such qualms,
and have taken to the task with gusto. Usually, they see the
role of law as the representation of something else, of some
other deeper integrationist force. Maybe it is an instrument
of capitalist expansion, the expression of a hegemonic
neoliberal ideology. Maybe it is a reflection of social life spilling
over national borders. Maybe it serves as a mask for political
preferences, a source of technocratic spillover. Probably it is
a combination of some of these things. I, for one, suspect it is
a combination of all of these things. And yet, I would be very
surprised indeed if the legal scholars, officials, lawyers and
judges involved in the construction of the Community legal
order would consider their work to have been a mask for
anything. The legal community ‘does’ law.
Perhaps law should be taken a little more seriously in the
social sciences. Perhaps we should not be looking so much
what lies behind law and a little more at what lies within the
realm of legal thought. Perhaps the legal community
distinguishes itself not so much by its shared commitment to
something else, but by its shared commitment to law itself.
Or rather, it distinguishes itself by a shared commitment to a
certain conception of law, and a certain conception of the
role lawyers play in society. My claim about the import of
these shared understandings is not, to my mind at least,
shocking or even controversial. Lawyers implicated in matters
of Europe form an elite, a fairly closely knit group of people
moving in a field of institutions and practices which have a
natural tendency to exalt their craft and so maintain the power
of law as an autonomous force in European integration. Their
collective understanding of their art and of themselves informs
in meaningful ways the extent to which the field succeeds in
upholding its autonomy. This is hardly a conspiracy theory-
just an assumption about people taking their professions
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the way their professional lives are shaped and structured.
I will try to identify and sketch some elements of these
shared understandings underlying European Community law.
I hasten to add that it really is not more than a rough sketch.
It overlooks important distinctions, generalises beyond what
is reasonable, undoubtedly distorts ideas and even lumps
together contradictory assumptions. Overall, however, I do
think it gives a fair idea of certain aspects of dominant legal
thought in matters European.
“Emancipatory Functionalism”
The principle of direct effect, one of the twin pillars un-
der the constitutionalisation of the Treaty, has famously been
described- by the late Federico Mancini, one of the most
influential ECJ judges in the history of the institution- as a
way of taking law out of the hands of bureaucrats and politi-
cians and giving it ‘back’ to the people. It is a stunning asser-
tion of the power of European law liberating civil society
from the shackles of parliamentary democracies. It is also at
odds with what most people would consider to be signified by
‘the rule of law.’ Made as a rather transparent warning to
the politicians of Europe not to curtail the powers of the Court
of Justice, it was accompanied by an effort to locate hostility
towards Europe and its law in the self-preserving interests of
the political and bureaucratic elites of the Member States.
As such, it was merely a spectacularly unsubstantiated claim
to the loyalties of Europe’s citizenry. Yet I am sure there was
more to it than mere self-interested posturing: Mancini- and
hundreds of lawyers with him- truly believed it. The idea is
‘emancipatory functionalism.’  The Community is placed at
the end of an evolution in ‘the history of law’, call it
‘modernisation’, towards ever bigger units of organised so-
cial life: from the family to the clan to the region to the State
to the Community. As social life expands, so does its legal
institutional framework. The rise of the nation-state was but
a stage in this evolution. The identification of law with the
nation-state, or even the idea that law is properly promul-
gated only by political institutions, is an unfortunate bump on
the road of legal evolution. Law belongs to civil society, and
civil society finds in European law the framework for its cross-
border dynamism. The question is how we get from the no-
tion of law ‘belonging’ to civil society to the reality of law
belonging to a class of lawyers and legal experts.
Law-as-culture, Law-as-science
At the risk of simplifying, one can distinguish two extreme
positions on the nature of law. One would see law as
essentially tied to a particular society and a particular culture.
Law, here, grows organically from a society’s evolving norms
and traditions. Two consequences flow from this immediately:
first, differences across different legal systems are not just
tolerable, they are inevitable. Second, imported or imposed
law which doesn’t reflect a particular society’s culture will at
best be dysfunctional and more likely will lead to all sorts of
legitimacy problems. The other would see law as an artefact,
a tool which can be sharpened by lawyers and legal experts,
that can be improved and made more efficient by technical
means. The ‘best’ solution is equally viable and desirable in
different societies; indeed, law, in this conception, can be
transferred from one place to another without much trouble.
Almost no one, I suspect, would actually take either position-
most legal scholars would introduce distinctions and
differentiations and ultimately take some middle position. As
a heuristic device, they may serve some purpose.
In European legal thought, law-as-culture collapses into
law-as-science. There are two different mechanisms to make
this happen.  In the first, European legal culture is defined by
law-as-science. The idea here is that one of the underlying
structural similarities between different societies in the Union
is a cluster of cultural practices associated with ‘the rule of
law’: the authority of general abstract rules, administered by
legal experts under exclusion of laypeople, the systematisation
of law by legal science. Abstraction, legalism, amor
intellectualis: these are not mere features of a particular
legal system in a particular stage of history, they are
constitutive of the very identity of Europe. The common
assertion that the Community is a ‘Community based on the
rule of law’ should be, at least in part, understood in this way,
and not just as describing a stage in, or even the culmination
of, a process of constitutionalisation. If this is what you think
about law, there are several implications for what you think
about European integration. First, law is a source of integration,
not merely an instrument of integration.  Second, the
‘legalisation’ of Europe is not about unelected technocrats
transforming Europe into something more and more remote
from the wishes and needs of the people of Europe, quite on
the contrary: the ‘legalisation of Europe’ is about constructing
a mode of governance that is more closely attuned to the
culture of European civil society than national politics can
ever aspire to be. If this is what you think about law and you
are a learned jurist, there are several implications about your
own role in Europe. Like the 19th century German jurist
Savigny, you picture yourself uncovering and unveiling the
Volksgeist, “the spirit of the people.” Like a modern day
Savigny, your faith is in your profession and your craft, not in
the legislature.
The second mechanism is evolutionary: as society evolves
inevitably to liberal capitalism, law evolves inevitably to law-
as-science. In Weberian terms, capitalism presupposes rational
social action which in turn presupposes a calculable legal
system and administration bound to rational rules of law.
Formal legal rationality substitutes substantive legal rationality.
With the legal system thus in place, crafted and administered
by a highly specialised legal profession, law detaches itself
from its socio-cultural grounding and becomes perfectly
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much talk of how European law is ‘rationalising’ market
regulation; I am quite sure that this mode of thinking informs
much of the pressure put over the past decade on the newly
acceded Member States to suspend with cumbersome
procedures to legislate the acquis into their legal systems
and just import the lot, wholesale and verbatim, from
Community law. If there is one thing that the Copenhagen
criteria have accomplished, it is the accumulation of air miles
for a whole army of Community lawyers travelling all over
the new Member States teaching the craft and trade of building
a liberal market democracy. The implications of this mode of
thinking for European law are relatively straightforward: as
if by magic, the conditions for legal harmonisation are
congruent with the conditions for economic development.
What’s more, one empowers the other. For the legal
profession, the Weberian logic generates a dynamic where
increased formal rationality leads to a very peculiar distinct
body of knowledge which leads to increased specialisation
and power for an elite of jurists.
Conclusion
As if by stealth, European law has largely transformed
the nature of European integration. An ECJ judge once
famously said that its judges entertained a certain idea of
Europe. This has largely been interpreted as a sure sign that
European law has been constructed in function of a political
strategy, a set of ideological preferences or commercial
interests widely shared on the bench, in academia, in law
firms, and in the Rue de la Loi. I think that there is a certain
idea of Europe inherent in a certain idea of law. This is not a
mere detour. Law structures discourse validates some lines
of argument and discards others, and limits world views. This
certaine idée du droit deserves a little more attention from
social scientists.
Law transcends borders by its very ‘lawness.’ It is an
autonomous force of integration, not the mere reflection of
political imperative or economic necessity. With many a
variation, and based on many different strands of thought
and ideology, my guess is that most people in the field of
Community law would subscribe to at least this much. It is a
powerful idea widely held by a powerful group which has
enjoyed an epistemic monopoly over many aspects of
European integration for decades. It is an idea that has
underpinned the cohesiveness and autonomy of the field.
As the Union is expanding in all ways imaginable, the
field of Community law is being reconfigured. No longer the
province of a relatively small group of specialised experts,
the field is growing in sheer numbers and diversifying
significantly as criminal lawyers, private lawyers, constitutional
lawyers and then some are being drawn in. Whether the
autonomy of the field will be maintained will depend in large
part on the strength of the common loyalty and commitment
of the expanding field to the idea of law. Yet, as the debate on
a code of European contract law exemplifies, we still have
decades of legal formalism and detachment from social life
ahead of us.
Harm Schepel
Harm Schepel is Senior Lecturer at Kent Law School
and Co-director of the Centre for European and
Comparative Law, University of Kent.
EU Law and the Failure of the ‘European’ Social
Scientific Imagination
Damian Chalmers
IS IT POSSIBLE TO REVISIT DEBATES which have never been had?
Harm Schepel’s penetrating piece would suggest that,
paradoxically, it is. His piece is a reconstruction of a well-
worn and heated debate in socio-legal studies between ‘law
and society’ and ‘law in society’ approaches to the study of
law. The former looks at the impacts of law on its subjects.
Society is presented as the external environment on which
law intervenes asymmetrically and unpredictably. It is the
task of the socio-legal scholar to discover, after the events,
the effects of these interventions. ‘Law in society’ approaches
consistent with developments in sociology that are dismissive
of reified, romantic ideas of the ‘social’ look at the
epistemology of the law, its vision of society: what image
does it draw of human relations; what ideologies, justified
true-beliefs does it draw on; how do the internal, formal
structures of the law reconstruct these; how do legal visions
of society compete with other collective visions, notably those
provided by statistics.
With some notable exceptions, of which Harm Schepel
is one, this debate is absent from EU studies. To be sure,
there are some ‘law in context’ approaches, but these tend to
see EU law as the hand maiden of the policy-making process.
Debate centres on how it constructs or alters national
government preferences; how it provides windows for non-
governmental and supranational actors to intervene in law-
making; how it allows court and legal professionals into policy-
making. These are all valuable and interesting debates, but
law’s power derives from its capacity to link the world of the
political with the worlds of economy, society, family. There is
contestation for law-making powers precisely,  because it
allows government both the power to exercise influence over
these worlds and the power to generate conditions which
enable new types of relations to develop within these worlds.
There has been very little socio-legal work, however, on EU
law’s impact on family relations; its transformation of working
patterns;  or the creation of new forms of natural environment.
To be sure, this is difficult because of the scale and diversity
of the Union, but the lack of work is disappointing,
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instruments of rule of the nation-state over the individual –
force, money, education, welfare – are not available: making
integration through law all the more central to EU government.
In this regard, Harm Schepel suggests that one of things
that  EU lawyers identify EU law as doing is ‘emancipatory
functionalism’. They argue EU law generates new
entitlements for individuals through doctrines such as direct
effect, which these can invoke before courts. For myself, I
think they elide the hidebound ideologies of legal professionals
who go before courts - and who therefore, inevitably, say EU
law is all about them and the rights they litigate -  with the
wider praxis. For EU law generates very few individual rights.
If one looks at the European Court of Justice, for example,
22 EC Treaty provisions,  7 Directives and 3 Regulations
accounted for 50% of its case law between 1998 and 2003.
The position is no different with national courts. In the period
up until the end of 1998, just 5 Directives accounted for 73%
of all the instances of Directives being invoked in reported
cases before British cases.1 Of course, it may be possible
that EU law generates a series of individual entitlements that
are never litigated or only appear in unreported cases, but
until some evidence, I, for one, will remain sceptical. If the
70,000 + pages of EU law do not generate many individual
rights, then what do they do? Even a brief perusal of the
Official Journal suggests an alternate narrative. They codify,
extend and discipline administrative power. Every area of
life governed by EU law is replete with the creation of new
regulatory agencies, new regulatory standards and new
responsibilities on private undertakings to report on and police
public goods. In short, EU law’s mission is not emancipatory
functionalism, but ‘utilitarian managerialism’. Its central
exponents are not lawyers, but administrators. Its central teloi
are not individual liberal values, which provide only an
ephemeral sheen over its bulk, but the depersonalised public
goods of the welfare and regulatory State, with all its corollary
dangers of perverse side-effects, excessive intrusion in local
life and cultural alienation.
The other claim is a ‘law in society’ claim. The argument
is that the professionalisation of EU law and its ties to the
ideals of liberal capitalism have resulted in its no longer being
able to be viewed as ‘law as culture’. It cannot be seen as
the organic product of any society linked to its evolving norms
and traditions. For me, the interesting thing about EU law is
that, unlike national laws, it has never made any serious claim
to do this. The central ties of repressive conformity identified
by Durkheim and his successors are that national law creates
the central symbols for a society’s collective self-identification
– nationality law, immigration law, criminal law, religious law.
Yet, these are not claimed, in any significant way, by EU law.
Indeed, at Maastricht and Edinburgh, it was clear that these
matters should not be touched by EU law and that EU law
would not transgress onto matters of national citizenship. To
be sure, in recent times, asylum and immigration law have
begun to be harmonised. But, even here, when one looks at
the central symbols - acquisition and loss of nationality, long-
term residence, expulsion – there is either very “lite” regulation
or, in the case of the long term residence rights directive, an
EC instrument that does little more than shadow pre-existing
national practices.
That said, one of law’s fates is that it cannot be ‘a-cul-
tural’: it cannot escape creating notions of community. The
problem with EU law is that because ‘law as science’ ren-
ders ‘law as culture’ opaque in its epistemologies, the com-
munities that it creates have an unattractive edge. Its central
bias is the protection of the institutions and communities of
the European market society. The market society here is not
some abstract supply and demand curve or set of liberal rights
to trade and own property, but rather a set of EU and national
institutions, which include governance regimes, contract and
property rights, supporting welfare and policing institutions.
One acquires rights in EU law only when one either actively
contributes to or does not disrupt the working of these. In
this, of course it has an ethnocentric tinge. Non EU nationals,
in particular, do not have the same rights as EU nationals. EU
law only exposes its fangs in the most sinister way, however,
where non-EU nationals threaten the institutions of the mar-
ket society. EU law allows the detention, impoverishment and
stripping away of family rights of asylum seekers or illegal
migrants precisely because of the threat these pose to wel-
fare institutions and labour markets and because asylum is
the bracket of the poor and dispossessed. If in the United
States it is increasingly dangerous for foreigners to be per-
ceived as politically threatening, economic threat is fast be-
coming the mantra of European legal repression. One can
identify EU law as ‘law as culture’, if one wants, but the
cultures it constructs are not cosy pre-political communities,
but rather market hybrids whose pervasiveness requires ex-
tensive internal responsibilities, policing and protection.
Damian Chalmers is Reader in European Union
Law at the London School of Economics
NOTES
1  For more on the incidence of EU law see  Chalmers, ‘The
Satisfaction of Constitutional Rhetoric by the European
Judiciary’located at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/
conference_JMC_Princeton/NYU_Princeton_Chalmers.rtf.